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# ADVOCATE OF PEACE.

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JANUARY, 1856.

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## CONSEQUENCES OF THE EUROPEAN WAR.

WHILE the friends of peace place their chief reliance on expositions of the evils, criminality and anti-christianity of war, for its abolition, they do not hesitate to add representations of its expense and impolicy, and its inefficacy in attaining its professed objects; well knowing that many men, especially those in power, are more deeply affected by the latter than the former. There was perhaps never a better occasion to point out the failure of a war to accomplish its declared designs, than that now raging on the Eastern Continent; and for that purpose we now give attention to it. The war is not indeed so far terminated that its results can be stated as facts; but the state to which it is now brought renders its most important probable consequences circumstances of easy and safe prediction.

Let us first look at Russia, who may be considered as having commenced the war, by the invasion of the Danubian Provinces. Putting aside the proposal to administer on the estate of the "sick man," which was exposed and abandoned, the next pretence of the Russian Czar was the maintenance of the rights and privileges of the Greek Christians in the Ottoman dominions. In this he was probably sincere, but the more important real object is well understood to be the annexation of the invaded Provinces, and the possession of Constantinople. By the valor of the Turks and the intervention of Austria, the Russian forces have been compelled to abandon the Danubian Provinces, and to retreat within their own boundaries; and the occupancy of Constantinople is a more remote and hopeless prospect than ever before. And after the success of the Allies, and the flush of victory in the Turks, no one we presume will venture to say, that any further relief of the Greek Christians from their oppressions, will be effected by Russian intervention. The whole object of the war, avowed or concealed, on the part of Russia, have plainly irrecoverably failed.

But this failure is what the Allies intended to effect, and will be claimed by them as accomplishments of their object. Let us see! The objects declared by England and France, in alliance, were to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the balance of power in Europe. The "bal-

ance of power!" The ghost of that chimera is reproduced by two nations, whose union can dictate laws to Europe and over Asia. What naval power could oppose the fleet sent to the Euxine and the Baltic: what land force withstand the conquerers of the Crimea? If the map of Europe is altered by this war, it will surely not be in favor of the independence of other nations. That no fear of being overwhelmed by the power of Russia was felt by its nearest neighbors, is evinced by the calm neutrality of Austria, Prussia and Sweden, at the present time. Suppose it were otherwise however; the danger of Russian power, if it existed, cannot be averted by the war. The allied governments, still holding the long cherished notion—refuted by history—that nations are more disposed to give bonds for "good behavior" after being beaten, than before, will find themselves mistaken. Russia will not make peace till her power, her territory, and her naval rights are restored; and if these were ever dangerous to her neighbors they will be so still.

But the integrity of the Ottoman Empire! Can any one believe this is to be maintained by controlling foreign armies on her own soil? Should these armies be entirely withdrawn at a peace, this Empire will be in the same exposure, and recommence the same decline as before, accelerated by the exhaustion of the war. Should these troops remain for her protection, she becomes a mere province of one or both of the Western Allies: let the British Government establish forts and commercial posts on the Bosphorus, and the fate of Turkey in Europe will be that of Hindostan and Caffraria and Burmah.

It may be thus predicted, almost as a certainty, not only that the professed objects of the war will not be attained by it, on either side; but that whatever change may be effected by it in the condition of the belligerent nations, cannot be such as either the benevolent Christian or the philanthropic politician can contemplate with pleasure: it adds another item to that long chain of wars by nations, claiming civilization, which after an immeasurable amount of sacrifice of human lives, extensive desolation of fertile fields, conflagrations of populous cities, interruption or ruin of peaceful commerce, impoverishing waste of treasure, the unappreciable woes of widows, parents and orphans, and the still more awful calamity of general demoralization, fail of every result professed to be sought at their commencement; and, by the mutual injury they inflict, defeat the alleged objects at which they aim. In the present case, the peace, the safety, the prosperity, the morality of Europe, will be far more precarious than before the war commenced; and the upheaving of sanguinary revolution, reasonably to be dreaded, must be met with exhausted resources and enfeebled power.

Is this insanity of nations never to cease? More than sixty years ago Jefferson denounced war as an unprofitable contest, designed only as an emulation in injury. He said, "it is entirely inefficient towards redressing wrong, and multiplies instead of indemnifying losses;" and Washington declared that it was "time for mad heroism to be at an end:" for forty years have peace societies and other friends of peace been

laboring to effect this purpose; they have appealed to rulers, held crowded conventions, distributed innumerable publications, and employed intelligent and active agents; and now, after a long period of general peace, increased international intercourse and commercial friendship,—when it was imagined that such Christian influences had been everywhere shed as to render war almost impossible—it has burst upon us in all the fury, the cruelty, the destructiveness and wastefulness, the crime and immorality, of any that has preceded it.

The friends of peace may learn a solemn lesson from this melancholy disappointment: they may see that the martial spirit is not to be allayed by the methods they have heretofore tried. Vain is the appeal to grasping sovereigns and cabinets, to settle by congresses and arbitrations, questions they do not desire to settle: vain is the prediction to the aristocracy of wealth, of national bankruptcy and augmented pauperism, when their own coffers will be more replenished: vain is the heart-rending representation of the slaughters and desolations of martial campaigns to military chiefs, in camp or in council, whose compassion is drowned in chivalric ardor: vain is the mournful tale of the sorrows of bereaved relatives; it is unheard in the shouts and illuminations of victory: vain even is the citation of the gospel precepts of benevolent forbearance to churches corrupted by power, or the blind multitude who revere no religion.

But let us not despair of the ultimate realization of the predicted reign of peace; a new path is yet open to it, but we have passed the space necessary to give direction to it; and propose to renew the subject, and point it out in next number.

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#### A PLEA FOR PEACE.

THANKSGIVING SERMON, *delivered November 22, 1855, in the Eleventh Baptist Church, in Philadelphia, by the REV. D. B. CHENEY, Pastor.*

“I AM FOR PEACE,”—Psalms cxv. 7.

The religion of the Bible is a religion of peace. Its spirit is a peaceful spirit. Coming to man arrayed in rebellion against his Maker, the gospel proposes terms of peace and reconciliation. It invites man to lay down the weapons of his rebellion, and to make his peace with God. In harmony with this prevailing characteristic of the religion of the Bible was the angelic chorus proclaiming the Saviour's birth “on earth peace, good will toward man”—as if they were the briefest possible summary of the principles of the Messiah's kingdom: “peace” and “good will.” Moreover, peace is revealed in prophecy as one of the characteristics of the latter day glory, when “men shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks, and when they shall learn war no more.

But while all this is so, and must be received by all who make the word of God their guide, still there is no other subject that occupies a twentieth part as much space in the history of the world as the subject of war. Open any